By Alex Wayman

Philosophy East and West Volume 46, Number 4 (October 1996) P 447-476 (C) by University of Hawai'i Press

    Introduction: Defense from What?

    There have been many discussions in India, where Yogaacaara originated, and elsewhere.  Inevitably it was   misrepresented   and  the   misrepresentation repeated  and copied.  Now, this  situation  is much more complicated  than would first appear.  In India there  was a practice  starting  from  the  Veda  of memorizing texts by repetition and transmitting them orally.  Much later in the A.D.  period  there was a writing  down of such scriptures, and then a copying of them.  The Buddhists transmitted their scriptures in a comparable manner, and the written-down  canon was also copied.  Such scriptures--whether  Hindu or Buddhist--are  regarded by the respective  groups as conveying truth.  Therefore, we cannot argue against copying  itself.  Clearly, it is what is copied that concerns  us now, namely, whether  or not there  are misrepresentations.

    Then, as concerns 'misrepresentations', it could be asked: What is wrong  with  them? Well, some  are good-natured  and  some  are  rather  venomous.   In general  there  is a great  range of such, extending from  speculations  and guesses  to downright  lies, that  are  repeated  and  copied.  In  the  case  of misrepresentations  of the Yogaacaara, I accept them as usually of the good-natured kind, whether it be a type  of refutation  in a Hindu  commentary, or by a Buddhist  opponent  of the Yogaacaara.  An important illustration  of the Hindu type of refutation  comes from  the  commentaries  on the Brahmasuutras, where the author, say `Sa^nkara, can write in terms of the system itself, setting forth its tenets, or attempts to  express  certain  tenets,  while  distorting  an opposing  system.(1) These Hindu  systems  and their rival  systems  were  established   by  geniuses  or otherwise  brilliant  persons.  It might  have  been thought  better  that  these  rival  systems  not be presented   correctly,  or   followers   might   get confused, wondering  if their own system  was indeed better, or whether a certain tenet being refuted was not  really  identical  with  a tenet  of their  own system.   Therefore,  when   the   Buddhist   system supposedly  being refuted in such a Hindu commentary can  reasonably   be  identified   with  a  sort  of Yogaacaara  position, it seems fair to conclude that it   is  a  good-natured   type   of refutation--one necessary for a successful commentary.

    Perhaps the same judgment could be rendered  for the quarreling  between  the Hindu logic school  and the  Buddhist  logicians, which  at least  in modern times   is  acknowledged   to  have  sharpened   the arguments  on both sides, so that when Buddhism left India around A.D. 1200, the Hindu logic school began to  stagnate  for  lack  of intelligent  opposition. I interpret also the Maadhyamika Buddhist refutation of the  Yogaacaara  philosophical  position  to be a good-natured  type--probably  more  an  exercise  in discourse, with the premise  that some tenets can be expounded in themselves and certain others can be clarified by the  refutation   of  an  opposing   position.   The Maadhyamika-type   refutation   of  the   Yogaacaara regarded its 'mind-only' (cittamaatra) teaching as a denial of the external  world, and further  took its 'store-consciousness'    (aalayavij~naana)   as   an unwarranted  addition  to the  traditional  list  of vij~naanas.

    Granting, then, that these sorts  of refutations are  not  made  out  of malice, one  must  face  the problem of what there is to defend against on behalf of the Yogaacaara.  I claim that this system  itself is  its  best  defense.   After  all,  Asa^nga,  the founder, wrote  the huge  Yogaacaarabhuumi  and  the Mahaayaanasa.mgraha, while  Vasubandhu, besides  his commentary   on  the  latter,  as  well  as  on  the Da'sabhuumika-suutra  and on the Madhyaantavibhaaga, popularized  the  system  in abbreviated  treatises. There  is no lack of texts  explaining  this system, whether in an argumentative or in a nonargumentative fashion.  Therefore, the role of the present  writer to defend the system really amounts to exposing  it, taking it as the important  thing, with ancient  and modern   writers   less  important   in  comparison. Accordingly,  the  defense  of  the  system  against anyone is really the system's own response;  and the role of the present  writer is to find this response of the system itself.

    To illustrate  what  is meant  by this  kind  of attitude, let us take the case of a review article I wrote  for Philosophy  East and West on Ashok  Kumar Chatterjee's  book  expounding  the  Yogaacaara.   I concluded:

    If  Chatterjee's   "Yogaacaara"  is  indeed  the Yogaacaara  person  that  Vasubandhu  was,  then Chatterjee's   book  is  certainly  a  wonderful exposition of the Yogaacaara philosophy. But, if the  Yogaacaara  fundamentals  are  what  I have indicated   above,  happening  to  be  in  rough agreement   with   [P.   T.]   Raju   and   with [Surendranath]  Dasgupta, the Chatterjee book is still worth reading as a philosophical  exegesis of what was traditionally  held, principally  by non-Yogaacaarins,   to   be    the    Yogaacaara position.(2)

    When  I  wrote   this,  it  was  already   known  to me--though   not   mentioned   in  the  review--that Chatterjee had adopted the very interpretation  that his teacher T.R.V.  Murti had espoused in chapter 13 of  his  well-known  book  on Maadhyamika.(3) As has already  been acknowledged, there  is nothing  wrong with this kind of copying  of a teacher's  position. But it also shows  that  if what  was copied  was in fact incorrect, the copy is also  incorrect.  Still, we do not know  yet if Murti  was incorrect  in that chapter.  The present  essay  will  deal  with  this matter later on.

    Another  example  is the  more  recent  work  by Schmithausen  on  the  Yogaacaara's  aalayavij~naana teaching,  wherein  Schmithausen  disagreed  with  a Japanese  scholar, H.  Hakamaya, who  insisted  that Asa^nga was the compiler  of the entire encyclopedic Yogaacaarabhuumi.   Here  Schmithausen   thought  to counter Hakamaya's position by noting the use of the scripture  Sa.mdhinirmocana  in some  parts  or  the larger work and not in other parts. About that scripture, Schmithausen concluded: "Therefore,  the  Sa.mdhinirmocana-suutra, at  least the  portions   concerned   with  the  new  kind  of vij~naana  distinguished  from the ordinary six, was most     probably      composed      before      the Vini'scayasa.mgraha.nii but after the Basic Section of  the  Yogaacaarabhuumi."(4)  It  happens   that  a Japanese   student,  H.   S.   Sakuma,  completed   a dissertation  at  Hamburg, approved  by Schmithausen, wherein  he presented  (in German) this very position stated  above--hence  copied.  In my  review  of this published  work I pointed  out: "One may refer  in my Analysis  of  the  'Sraavakabhuumi   Manuscript,  (5) 110-11,  to  a  passage   on  the  three   doors   of vipa'syanaa. This passage is virtually the same as is found in the Sa.mdhinirmocanasuutra, ch. 8, sect. 10. This   is   a  proof   that   the   author   of   the Sraavakabhuumi--agreed  to be the oldest part of what Sakuma calls Maulii Bhuumi [the 'Basic Section']--had available  and used  the  Sa.mdhinirmocanasuutra."(6) This, then, is an example of where the copying turned out  to be incorrect, and  was  defended  against  by calling attention to what the Yogaacaara  itself says about the matter.

    These two examples  should clarify what is meant by misrepresentations  (or possible  ones) that  are defended  against--not  really by the present writer as  an  independent   thinker,  but  rather  by  the Yogaacaara  system itself being brought to bear upon the alleged misrepresentation.  This essay continues with  two main sections  below: (1) The Position  of the  Yogaacaarins  and  (2)  Clarification   of  the Position.

    The Position of the Yogaacaarins

    Here I present  four topics: (a) Vasubandhu  and an early scripture; (b) about cittamaatra; (c) about aalayavij~naana; and (d) about three lak.sa.na.

    Vasubandhu  and  an Early  Scripture.  Some  authors treat  the Yogaacaara  system  as though  it were an invention  of  the  founders, notably  the  brothers Asa^nga and Vasubandhu. To suggest otherwise, may we notice  that  Bhikkhu  ~Naa.nananda  has  put out  a booklet   on  the   Kaa.lakaaraama   Sutta.(7)  This scripture  is  in  the  A^nguttara-Nikaaya, Book  of Fours, where  it was translated  by Woodward,(8) who noticed  certain textual  difficulties.  The Bhikkhu used some other editions  and studied  Buddhaghosa's commentary  on every word for his English rendition, wherein he obviously uses Woodward's  words whenever possible.  In the following  I have  substituted  my rendition   'gods  and  humans'  and  subdivide  the translation with brief, bracketed remarks.

    The Kaa.lakaaraama Sutta.  [The Setting.] At one time the Exalted  One was staying  in Saaketa in Kaa.laka's  monastery.  There  the  Exalted  One addressed  the monks, saying: "Monks."  "Revered Sir," replied those monks in assent. [As a Vedic or Greek god would talk, declaring omniscience,] the Exalted One said: "Monks, whatsoever  in the world  with its gods, Maaras  and Brahmas, among the progeny consisting of recluses and brahmins, gods  and  humans--whatsoever  is  seen,  heard, sensed (sensations arising from taste, touch and smell), cognized, attained, sought  after  and  pondered over  by the mind--all  that  do I know.  Monks, whatsoever  in the world...  of gods and humans, --whatsoever is seen,... by the mind,--that have I fully  understood;  all that  is known  to the Tathaagata, but the Tathaagata has not taken his stand upon it. [Now he denies alternatives to be construed   as  four  in  number,  because   the scripture is in the Book of Fours.] If I were to say: 'Monks, whatsoever  in the  world...  of... gods  and humans--whatsoever  is seen...  by the mind--all  that  I do not know'--it  would  be a falsehood in me.  If I were to say: 'I both know it  and  know  it  not'--that  too  would  be  a falsehood  in me.  If I were  to say: 'I neither know it nor am ignorant  of it'--it  would  be a fault in me.  [The Buddha  now declares  how one uses the senses while avoiding the 'apprehender' and   the   'apprehended'.]   Thus,   monks,   a Tathaagata  does not conceive of a visible thing as apart from sight;  he does not conceive of an 'unseen',   he   does   not   conceive    of   a 'thing-worth-seeing', he does not conceive about a seer. He does not conceive of an audible thing as apart from hearing;  he does not conceive  of 'an  unheard',  he  does   not  conceive   of  a 'thing-worth-hearing',  he  does   not  conceive about a hearer.  He does not conceive of a thing to be sensed  as apart  from sensation;  he does not conceive of a 'thing-worth-sensing', he does not conceive  about one who senses.  He does not conceive  of a cognizable  thing  as apart  from cognition;   he   does   not   conceive   of   a 'thing-worth-cognizing', he  does  not  conceive about   one  who  cognizes.   Thus,  monks,  the Tathaagata, being  such-like  in regard  to  all phenomena  seen, heard, sensed, and cognized, is 'Such'.  Moreover, than  he who is 'Such', there is  none  other  greater  or  more  excellent, I declare."  [Now verses  on how ordinary  persons use their senses, sometimes  called 'the fantasy of normalcy'.]

    Whatever  is seen, heard, sensed or clung to, is esteemed as truth by other folk.

    Midst  those  who are  entrenched  in their  own views, being  'Such'  I hold none as true or false.

    This barb  I beheld, well  in advance  [i.e., at the foot of the Bodhi tree], whereon  humans are hooked, impaled.

    "I know, I see,'tis verily so"--no such clinging for the Tathaagatas.

    This    scripture    clarifies    the   Buddhist prescription  "to see things  as they  really  are," since it implies  that one should simply see without adding anything.  Recall the ancient  Hermes epigram found  on a Grecian  urn: "Who shall  say more, will lie."(9) As to the 'barb' of the verse, the Paali is salla.m, equivalent  to the Vedic word 'salya, which down the centuries means an 'arrow', on which one is impaled  (if such  be the case).  I have cited  this scripture  in this essay because  I do believe  that Vasubandhu's  popularizing  treatises  have  such  a scriptural source in the background.

    About  Cittamaatra.  Past  writings  on  this  topic uniformly    render   the   term   cittamaatra    as 'mind-only', and  so  do I also  in  my  own  former essays.  Notice that such renditions  take the topic outside  India  by  way  of Asian  translations  and essays  in English  and European  languages.  Inside India, where  the term  originated, the words  citta and maatra appeared as such with connotations of Sanskrit words;  outside, there was the connotation  of the words 'mind' and 'only'. I  propose  to  consider   these  words  with  their connotation in the Sanskrit language.

    In current lexical  work I have learned  various usages of the term maatra.(10) The lexicons of India recognize a neuter form maatra.m and a feminine form maatraa, so the adjectives can go with the neuter or the feminine.  Of the two definitions for the neuter form--'all,   the   entirety'   (kaartsnya)  ,   and 'restriction  to the  instance'  (avadhaara.na)--the adjective  'only'  could agree with 'restriction  to the instance'.

    The  rendition   'only'   works  for  the  other definition--the entirety.  For example, there is the compound  sthaanamaatra, in the meaning  'a place in general', thus any and all places and excluding what is not a place.  When cittamaatra  is understood  in this way, the citta is unmixed with anything that is not  citta.   Accordingly,  if  we  suppose  in  the compound cittamaatra  that maatra means 'only', then is only one of the two senses intended, or can it be both?

    It is well to point  out that  other  adjectives are  feasible   from  the  feminine   maatraa.   The definition 'any measure' (maana) yields the entry in Apte's   Sanskrit-English    dictionary   paromaatra ('vast')  for  the  spatial  measure   and,  in  the lexicons,  tatkaalamaatra   ('at   once')  for   the temporal measure--and also alpa ('a trifle') as well as ak.sibhaaga  ('a mirror').  As adjectives applied to   cittamaatra,  we  could   say   'amounting   to mind'--both  spatially  and temporally.  Or we could say 'just mind'  and 'mirroring  mind', and, for the latter, perhaps also 'being mirrored by mind'.

    In  a  previously  published  essay, I presented Asa^nga's   statement   on   cittamaatra,  which   I translated   in  part.(11)  It  is  clear  that  the Buddhist opponents  did not criticize on the grounds that Asa^nga  denied  the existence  of the external world  (which, of  course, he did  not  do).  As the first attack, the opponent  states: "it is not valid that  there  is  a  mind-only  in  the  sense  of  a 'continuous substantiality'  (dravyatas), because it contradicts scripture."  The opponent is asked: "How does it contradict scripture?" That person responds: "He (the  Buddha) said, 'If the citta  consisted  of lust defilement  (upakle'sa) and consisted of hatred and  delusion   defilement,  it  could   not  become liberated.'"  Asa^nga  replies:  "But  what  is  the objection  to that?" He seems to mean that we accept what the Buddha taught, and so if the citta does not consist  of these defilements  (or contain them), it would  be liberated;  hence  your scriptural  appeal cannot    deny    to    mind-only    a   'continuous substantiality'.  The opponent does not give up, and retorts: "Mind-only by itself is invalid, because if there  is not two together, when one does not resort to  representation  (vij~napti) of  lust,  etc., one would be free (of those defilements) [which  we know is not the case]."

    The  opponent  is  obviously  a follower  of the Buddhist  Abhidharma, which teaches that there is no citta without a caitta (=caitasika- dharma)--a 'mental'.(12) That we cannot have a citta by itself is the second meaning I treated above, the 'totality'  sense, all  citta, unmixed  with anything  else.  But Asa^nga  appears to espouse this 'totality'  sense.  His response  starts by saying   "There   is   no  fault   in   a  prior representation," and continues:

    There  is what was said by the Bhagavat, to wit, "concomitant  (sahaja) feeling  (vedanaa),  idea (sa.mjnaa), and  thinking-volition  (cetanaa), " and  what  was  said  (by  Him), to  wit, "These natures  (dharma) are mingled, not unmingled, so these  natures   are  not  objects  individually separated  out;   or  when  separated  out  (not objects) for reference as distinct, or clear, or different."  To demonstrate  the meaning  of the mingling  he used the simile  of the light  of a butter  lamp.(13) Accordingly, if they were  not concomitant, it would also have been improper to say they are mingled.

    Asa^nga has cited a scripture  in Buddhist  Sanskrit equivalent  to the  Mahaavedalla-sutta  of the Paali canon  Majjhima-Nikaaya.   Apparently  for  Asa^nga, concomitance  does  not deny a pure  citta  any more than  it  denies  a  pure  feeling,  and  so  forth. Ordinary  thinking  is not able to separate  out the individual   factors,  because   they  are  mingled. Presumably, it takes a yogin to separate  the mental items.  Then this yogin can arrive  at a pure citta. The Pata~njali  Yogasuutra  seems  to have a similar idea   when   it   refers   to  'cessation   of  the modifications of the citta' (cittavr.rtti-nirodha).

    Now I shall  deal with three  subtopics: (1) the phrase cittamaatra.m  yad uta traidhaatukam, (2) the Yogaacaara  theory  of  ekaagracitta,  and  (3)  the theory that Vasubandhu denies the external world.

    The Phrase Cittamaatra.m  yad uta traidhaatukam. There  is a rather  famous  passage  in the Buddhist Da'sabhuumika-suutra, its Sixth Stage (bhuumi). This has   been   cited   as   cittamaatra.m    yad   uta traidhaatukam, and  the scripture's  translation  by Megumu  Honda,  as  revised  by  Professor  Johannes Rahder, understands  this to mean "This triple world is mind-only."(14) Sylvain  Levi, in a learned  note at  the  beginning  of  his  French  translation  of Vasubandhu's  Vi.m'satikaa   (the  Twenty  Verses) , presents  several versions  of this formula, in each case showing  the form traidhaatukam, and he appears to recognize  that  the Da'sabhuumika-suutra  is the source of such nonscriptural citations of the entire formula.(15) This passage has seemed to support  the claim that the Yogaacaara  denies  the existence  of the  external  world,  as  here, 'three  worlds'--of desire, form, and the formless worlds, according  to the usual Buddhist dogmatics.

    Now,  one  of  the  difficulties  of  the  usual translation  and consequent  interpretation  is that this  scripture,  the  Da'sabhuumika-suutra, is  not really a Yogaacaara scripture.  Indeed it is a basic scripture of Mahaayaana  Buddhism and is not devoted to  the  particular   philosophical   view   of  the Yogaacaara.  The particular  phrase was inserted  by that  scripture  within  a discussion  of  Dependent Origination, which  is  important  to  all  Buddhist schools.

    Vasubandhu,  in  his   great   commentary   on   the Da'sabhuumika-suutra,  gives  two  explanations  for this   phrase,  neither   of  which   promotes   any particular  theories of the Yogaacaara  school, even though  the first  explanation  uses  the Yogaacaara theory   of  multiple   vij~naanas.(16)  This  first explanation   goes  into  the  Buddhist   theory  of waywardness  (viparyaasa), and then  announces  that the 'mind-only'  passage was promulgated so that one may  be liberated  from  the  'store  consciousness' (aalayavij~naana)   and   from   other   perceptions (vij~naana). Here, the sense of maatra.m seems to be 'amounting  to', that is,'amounting  to mind', where the  'mind'   (citta)  here   stands   for  all  the vij~naanas, counted as seven or eight. These are the perceptions    (vij~naana)   based   on   the   five outer-directed  senses, the manovij~naana  based  on the mind  (manas) as an inner  sense  organ, and the 'store  consciousness'  (for  7), or  number  7, the 'defiled  mind'  (kli.s.tamanas),  plus  the  'store consciousness' for 8.

    If someone  of Madhyamaka  persuasion  had  been commenting, probably  only  the first  six vij~naana would   be  mentioned.   Therefore,  it  is  not   a particular  Yogaacaara  teaching here that is meant, but simply that these various  perceptions  are what lead to waywardness (viparyaasa) and then to rebirth according  to the precepts of Dependent Origination. Vasubandhu   was  entitled  to  interpret  the  term cittamaatra  by the  set  of vij~naana  because  the Abhidharma  gives  the  terminological   set  citta, manas,   vij~naana,  which   allows   their   mutual substitution    in    certain    contexts;(17)   and Candrakiirti's       autocommentary      on      his Madhyamakaavataara  also changes the cittamaatra  of the  famous  formula  about  the 'three  worlds'  to vij~naanamaatra  in his section attempting to refute the 'store consciousness' (aalayavij~naana).(18)

    The  second  explanation  has  to  do  with  the formula  of  Dependent  Origination,  and  here  the 'thought'  is that  of the Buddha, who realized  the formula  with just  one thought  (ekacitta) and then taught it in a twelvefold way.  Here, the meaning of maatra.m  is the  temporal  sense  'at  once'  or in temporal sequence when the twelve members are taught one after another, thus taking  time, eventually  to have  the theory  that  the twelve  amount  to three lives.

    And this information  from Vasubandhu shows that the rendition of traidhaatukam  as 'three worlds' is incorrect.  The Sanskrit  term is a derivative  noun from  'three  worlds'  (tridhaatu).  The  derivative nouns  of Sanskrit  have  to be interpreted  by each such term. For example, Gautama is the derivative of Gotama;  this  is a family-type  of derivative  such that  Gautama  is  the  descendent  of  Gotama.  The derivative  pauru.sa from puru.sa (a human person or man) applies more to the present  case, because as a masculine  noun  pauru.sa  can mean  'human  action' (karman) and  'the  weight  that  one man with  both hands           can          raise          upwards' (uurdhvavist.rta-do.hpaa.nin.rmaana) .(19)  We   can also interpret traidhaatukam in two ways.  Both ways take  the  derivative  here  to  be the  formula  of twelvefold  Dependent  Origination, that is, that it is derived from, or faithful  to, the three  worlds, so realized  in one moment's  thought  by the Buddha and then taught  in twelve terms. This one-moment's thought is a variety of cittamaatra.  The  other  interpretation  of  the twelvefold  formula is that it is the way of rebirth through waywardness due to the set of Vij~naana, and this is a different  interpretation  of cittamaatra. But rebirth  requires--that  is, is related  to--the three worlds.  Neither of Vasubandhu's  explanations in this commentary justifies the interpretation that the  passage, so misrendered--to  wit, "This  triple world is mind-only"--has anything to do with denying the existence of the external world.

    The natural  question, then, is how should  that Sanskrit  phrase  be  rendered? I  would  offer: the derivative of the three worlds is only mind. That is to say, whatever  may  be the  'three  worlds'  in a minimal sense--whatever  else is attributed to them, an elaboration  of them, a product of them--has been added  by the mind.  In one case it was added by the mind  of  the  Buddha--the   twelvefold  formula  of Dependent  Origination.  In the  other  case  it was added by the mind of other sentient  beings.  Hence, such  an  observation   agrees  with  the  scripture translated  above, the  Kaa.lakaaraama  Sutta, which gave the message  that to see things  as they really are, one must not add anything.  Apparently  the six senses (when normal) see things  as they really are, and it is the perceptions  (vij~naana) based thereon that  do the adding.  But this is the interpretation of cittamaatra  when it is tantamount  to the set of vij~naana.  This shows that it was proper  for me to cite that scripture as a background  of Vasubandhu's position.

    Besides, the  large  chapter  3 of  Vasubandhu's Abhidharmako'sa and his own commentary is devoted to the worlds, which, when  in two  sets, are the world of sentience  (sattva-loka) and  the  support  world (bhaajana-loka).(20) He was therefore  very familiar with the respective attributions  of these two kinds of  worlds.   He  would  undoubtedly   know  of  the scripture   in   the   Diigha-nikaaya,  III,  called Agga~n~na-sutta  (though  in the  Buddhist  Sanskrit AAgama version)--a scripture  on the Buddhist theory of  genesis.   One  may  read  the  account  in  the translation of the Paali-version  that, after a long period, this world passes  away.  This is the Indian theory   of  cycles,  with  the  passing   away  and emergence  of the  'support  world'.  The  scripture mentions  that  with the passing  away  the sentient beings had retreated  to a 'higher'  realm--that  of Form (ruupa-dhaatu)--and while the world was plunged in watery  darkness, they were 'made of mind, fed on joy, and were  self-luminous.  The earth  reappeared like a scum on the cooling  water and became endowed with  color, odor, and  taste.  The sentient  beings tasted  this  and found  it very sweet.  As they ate more   and   more,   they   gradually   lost   their self-luminance,  while   the  moon  and  sun  became manifest.  The beings had evidently  fallen into the realm  of desire.(21) In such an account  we see the prior disappearance  and reappearance of the support world, and that the sentient world follows suit.

    Accordingly, the  way  of translating  that  phrase about cittamaatra  and the traidhaatuka  that I have had to discard, namely  that  the three  worlds  are dependent  upon  citta, would  have  been  in direct violation of the Genesis story. I don't believe that Vasubandhu  would have taken a position in his brief popularizing  works  in  direct  opposition  to  the Buddhist scriptures.

    The Yogaacaara  Theory  of Ekaagracitta.  It was pointed out above that the Buddha was credited  with realizing    the   entire   formula   of   Dependent Origination  with  "one-moment's  thought."  In that place, the term was ekacitta. The theory of Buddhist meditation  sets forth a goal called samaadhi, which is defined as ekaagracitta. This term has frequently been rendered "one-pointed  thought (or mind)." Then what is meant by the Sanskrit  word agra? Since this is an important  term in the Sanskrit  language, the Indian lexicographers  have had to make it a defined word. Over four of their lexicons include for it the definition  aalambana.(22) Literally, this  means  a 'support'. Many years ago I learned that this is the basic term in Buddhism for the 'reflected  image' in the  mind,(23) which  is what  one  should  meditate upon, given  that  it is an appropriate  object  for such meditative  purposes.  It follows  that  such a definition  permits  a translation  for  the  entire compound  ekaagracitta, namely  "mind  on  a  single meditative    topic."    Also,   see    Vasubandhu's Abhidharmako'sa,   chapter    1,   for   a   similar distinction between the outer sense object (vi.saya) and the mental reflection (aalambana).(24)

    Besides,  three  of  these  four  lexicons  also defined the expression  ekaagra, namely as "a single continuity"   (ekataana)  and   as  "being   without discord" (anaakula).  So the expression ekaagracitta can  be further  explained  for  the  practice  of a yogin, to  wit, "the  mind  or  consciousness  as  a single continuity  and as without  discord."(25) The two definitions  go together, because the continuity would  be  broken  if the  mind  were  subjected  to discord.  And in such  a case there  would  not be a "single meditative  object."  This is an implication of the definition  I found, namely ekataana, because this  contrasts  with  a well-known  Buddhist  term, sa.mtaana, which is usually understood  as a "stream of   consciousness, "  but   which   the   foregoing information  suggests should be better rendered as a "mingled  stream  of consciousness."  I should  call attention  to the  fact  that  the  prefix  sam-  in Sanskrit  is cognate  with  an Indo-European  prefix that is present  in English as con-  in the sense of "together," that is, that in the ordinary  case of a sa.mtaana, the continuity (taana) is composite.

    Therefore, when a modern Tibetan  author, Lozang Tsewang, in a published seminar paper, writes, "Lord Buddha says in the suutras: 'The consciousness  of a sentient being is of a single stream'"(26) (but does not  identify  the  suutra  so  saying),  the  cited passage might mean what I called attention to above, that  although  the mental  factors  are  mingled, a yogin
--if successful--may separate out the citta and find it  consisting  of  a  single  stream.   But  it  is important  to notice  that the yogin  does this with his  own  mind, and  because  he is  engrossed  in a samaadhi. He does not do this separating  out in the minds  of other sentient  beings, who cannot  verify that  the consciousness  is of a single  stream, for the reasons that the mental factors  are mingled and that  they  have  not  learned  how  to go into  the appropriate samaadhi.  This Tibetan author attempted to  apply  that  cited  passage  in  a philosophical treatment of the Yogaacaara position.  But it is not valid to argue  that something  is the case with all minds (and their presumed  objects) when it was only the  case  of  a  certain  yogin  and  his  personal attainment.

    The Theory that Vasubandhu  Denies  the External World.   Certainly   some   readers   decided   that Vasubandhu's      twenty-verse     treatise     (the Vi.m'saatikaa) involves  a denial  of  the  external world. And such persons are entitled to say: suppose we grant your previous  argument  about  cittamaatra and the traidhaatuka.  Even so there  are verses  in that  Vasubandhu  treatise  that appear  to deny the external  world.  Before going into those particular verses, it is well  to notice  the situation  in his Abhidharmako'sa.  Abhidharma Buddhism recognizes six senses and their objects, from the sense of eye with its object of formations  (in shape or color) to the sense  of mind  (manas) with  its object  of natures (dharma) .   But  this  does   not  mean  that   one necessarily   perceives   such  sense  objects.   So Buddhism   taught   that  there  is  a  'perception' (vij~naana) based  on the eye, and so with the other senses as bases (aayatana).  Because  the senses had the power to apprehend  those various  objects, they were given  the Sanskrit  name indriya, a word which means  'a  power'.   It  follows  immediately   that 'perception' is powerless;  that is, it is unable to contact  the  object  directly, but must  depend  on whatever the sense organ comes up with.

    Bareau  presents  the manner in which Vasubandhu treated  this  matter  in  his  Abhidharmako'sa:(27) ruupa.m pa~ncendriyaa.ny  arthaa.h pa~ncaavij~naptir eva ca (1, 9) ("Formation is five sense organs, five objects, and non-representation"); cak.su.h pa'syati ruupaa.ni  sabhaaga.m  na tadaa'srita.m  vij~naana.m d.r'syate  ruupa.m na kilaantarita.m  yata.h (I, 42) (Bareau's  translation: "When it is in condition  to work, the  eye sees  formations;  the  consciousness which  is leaning  on it does not (see  formations), because  formation,  then  being  concealed, is  not seen").  If we grant that perception  fails to reach the object that was apprehended by a sense organ, we begin    to   notice    how    perception,   perhaps automatically, adds to the sensory  evidence, as was discussed  above.  And this may help to explain  why the  same  art  object  is  viewed  differently   by different persons--presumably  it was about the same as a sense  object, but the  subjective  perceptions evaluate it quite divergently.

    Now   to   the   twenty-verse   treatise.    The translation from the Chinese by Hamilton(28) was reprinted  in A Source  Book  by Radhakrishnan  and  Moore.(29) We learn  there  that these twenty verses are on vij~naptimaatrataa, there rendered   'Representation-Only'.   It  is  somewhat embarrassing  to me to point  out  what  the editors have added in their footnote  on page 328, because I have   always   had  great   admiration   for   both Radhakrishnan   and  Moore.   They  say:  "A  better translation    of   vij~naptimaatrataa    would   be 'ideation-only, '  since  'representation'  suggests rather than denies external reality."  Well, no fair mistranslating  a Sanskrit  term just to make  one's theory  come out right! That remark was made because of  thinking  that  Vasubandhu's   treatise   denies external reality.

    Sylvain  Levi's edition(30) of the Sanskrit  for the twenty  verses numbers  them as twenty-two.  His verse  1 can be taken as introductory, and his verse 22 as concluding.  The translation from the Chinese, as  presented  by  Hamilton,  starts  with  Sanskrit number  2  as  the  first  verse.   This  is  Levi's introductory verse with my translation:

    vij~naptimaatram evaitad asadarthaavabhaasanaat/ yathaa taimirikasyaasatke'sacandraadidar'sana.m//

    This  just  amounts  to  representation, as  the sight of unreal hair, moon, etc.  of one with an eye-caul--because    being    the   (subsequent) manifestation   of  an  unreal  artha  (external thing).

    This  introductory  statement  does not deny  an external   object.   Instead   there   is  a  mental representation that amounts to tinsel,'fool's gold', a false wealth.  Vasubandhu appears to mean that the mind imagines  an external  artha  in front, but the mind has only a report or representation of what the sense organ had sensed.

    his  is Levi's  verse, and  what  for both  the Chinese   and  the  Tibetan  is  verse  1,  with  my rendition (Levi had to reconstruct the Sanskrit):

    yadi vij~naptir anarthaa niyamo de'sakaalayoh/ sa.mtaanasyaaniyama's ca yuktaa k.rtyakriyaa na ca //

    If  representation   lacks  an  external  object (artha),  there  is  no  certainty  (aniyama) of space  and time;  there  is no certainty  of the composite  stream  (of consciousness) and agency is not valid.

    We notice  again that Vasubandhu  does not here deny an external  object, because  the sentence  makes  a supposition, "If...."  The  verses  go on to make  a distinction   between   the   beings   of  different destinies,  gods,  humans,  hungry  ghosts,  and  so forth, in how they view externals. Thus the gods see the river sparkling with gems, humans see it as good to drink, and  the hungry  ghosts  (preta) find  the river full of unclean  things rendering  it unfit to drink. We notice this difference in terms of destiny classes that it involves the use of external things. Again, it is not a denial of external objects, but a claim  that  different  destinies  have  a different addition (philosophically false) to what was sensed.

    Then  there  is what  is  numbered  verse  16 in Hamilton's  translation, where he renders  the first part  as follows: "As has  been  said, the  apparent object  is a representation.  It is from that memory arises"  (the  Sanskrit   for  this:  ukta.m  yathaa tadaabhaasaavij~napti.h;    smara.na.m    tata.h)  . Hamilton translates  the commentary on this:(31) "As We have said earlier, although  there is no external object,  a   sense   representation,  visual,  etc., appears  as an outer  object.  From  this comes  the later   state   with   its  memory   associate,  the discriminated  mental representation, appearing as a seeming  former  object.  Then we speak of this as a memory of what has been already experienced." Notice that Hamilton translated  the first sentence of this commentary  as though  there is denial of the copula ("although  there is no external object").  But when we consult  the Sanskrit  that Levi  edited, we find the  sentence   worded  differently:  "Even  in  the absence of an external object" (vinaapy arthena). It is necessary  to translate this way to make sense of the   comment   that   Hamilton   translates    from Chinese:(32) "That  is, he defends  his position  by saying   that  there  must  have  been  this  object immediately  received in the past by the five organs of sense, eye, etc.  [so  that]  in the present  the intellective  consciousness  is able  to hold  it in memory."

    We have  probably  all had  such  an experience, when concentrating  on some  problem  or passage, if someone  comes  to the  door  and  says, "Dinner  is ready" and, not immediately  hearing  a response  of the   type   "O.K.   I'm   coming, "  continues,  "I said:  'Dinner    is    ready'!  "--whereupon    the concentrating  person  responds, "I  heard  you  the first time"--not exactly as this person now says it, because  if we mean by hearing  the actual sounds as heard at the time the sounds  are made, this is true just  for  the  reception   by  a  sense  organ  (of hearing), and  not  true  for  auditory  perception. According  to Vasubandhu, as the Chinese  commentary here understood him, the person remembered the words "Dinner is ready."

    Thus,  "even  in  the  absence  of  an  external object," that  is, even  though  that  sound  is  no longer  sounding, a person  may hear  it as a memory image. Due to the actual experiences of yogins, this situation   was  taken  for  granted.   There  is  a celebrated  case  associated  with what  in Buddhist history  is called  the Second Council, to determine if certain  erring monks should  be ousted  from the Sa.mgha:  all  the  senior  monks  were  called   to assemble  for the hearings, but one  of these  monks was    in    the    deep    concentration     called nirodha-samaapatti. According to the story, upon his emerging  from the samaadhi  a divinity gave him the message, whereupon  he sped  to the  meeting.(33) It should  be admitted  that this yogin remembered  the message, while the instigating  sound  was no longer sounding.

    Thus, when we examine  the text more  carefully, we find that Vasubandhu  does not deny the existence of external  objects  in this  and in the previously cited materials, even though the translator, just by his manner of  translating, made  it  appear  so.  Besides, two authors of recent books translating  a number of the Vasubandhu  treatises agree that Vasubandhu does not deny   an  external   object   (Kochumuttom(34)  and Anacker(35)).

    As to Murti's chapter, previously  alluded to, a few words  will suffice.  A reader  of that chapter, supposedly   on  the   'absolutism'   of   Vedaanta, Maadhyamika, and vij~naanavaada, will  readily  find out  that  the  Yogaacaara   position  (called  here 'Vij~naanavaada') is set forth, not from  Yogaacaara books, but from their rival Vedaanta and Maadhyamika books.  Having  decided  that the opponents  must be right, when he then cites a Yogaacaara  treatise  it must be made to agree with Murti's supposition.  So, referring  to the  Madhyaantavibhaaga, he says, "The constructed subject-object world is unreal; but this does not make the abhuutaparikalpa  unreal;  for, it is the  substratum  for  the  unreal  subject-object duality.  It  is,  however,  non-conceptual."(36) So abhuutaparikalpa, which  means  "the imagination  of what  did not (really) happen," is 'non-conceptual'! I conclude  that  Murti  in this  chapter  does  not advance the understanding of Yogaacaara Buddhism.

    About   AAlayavij~naana.   When   we  turn   to  the Yogaacaara  theories  that  devolve  about  the term aalayavij~naana, we notice  that what must have been a hotly  contested  point  even  in the time  of the Buddhist  master Asa^nga  is still in present  times disputed.  I  already  mentioned  that  there  is  a two-volume work on the topic by Schmithausen.  Here, under a heading "Introduction  and Original  Meaning of AAlayavij~naana," he points  to a passage  in the Samaahitabhuumi   portion  of  the  Yogaacaarabhuumi about  a person  in the  deep  concentration  called nirodha-samaapatti, and that it is a continuance  of the aalayavij~naana with its seeds, which shows that even though  various  other  mental  functions  have ceased, vij~naana  itself  has not ceased, and these seeds  will  bring  forth  the  evolving   types  of vij~naana   when   the  person   emerges   from  the samaadhi.(37) Schmithausen  calls  this the "Initial Passage"  here and a number of times later on in his work. He goes on to claim (38) that  the  passage, although  not stating  this explicitly, implies that the continued  presence  of the aalayavij~naana  has kept alive  that yogin who is in nirodha-samaapatti. And  if that  is so, then  the aalayavij~naana  must also be associated with the moment of conception  in the womb, (39) and so this is the vij~naana on which Name-and-Formation     (naama-ruupa)    arises    in dependence--in  the usual  sequence  of the Buddhist Dependent Origination.  Accordingly, he insists that the pratisa.mdhi  (or 'linking', the 'rebirth') kind of vij~naana  is that initial  aalayavij~naana  that descends  into the male-female  element union in the womb.(40)

    the course of his investigation he was led to disagree   with  various   Japanese   scholars   who understood  these matters  differently  from him.  I shall have to evaluate  whether his conclusions  are consistent   with  the  positions  of  Asa^nga,  the founder  of the  Yogaacaara, or  of  Vasubandhu, the great popularizer thereof.

    It  happens   that  Asa^nga   himself--obviously responding   to   a   number   of   challenges   and condemnations of this aalayavij~naana position--gave his answers in the opening section of his exegetical section   called  Vini'scayasa.mgraha.nii,  which  I employ in the Tibetan version  in the Tanjur.  There we learn that the 'store consciousness' is the abode of  seeds  (aalayavij~naana.m  biijaa'sraya.h) .(41) Asa^nga claims that this is a secret teaching of the Bhagavat,  citing   a  well-known   verse  from  the Sa.mdhinirmocana-suutra  about  the aadaanavij~naana (the  consciousness  that 'takes'  [seeds]).(42) But the  reader  of  this  section   cannot   avoid  the conclusion  that  Asa^nga  is convinced  that of the many  references  to vij~naana  in the old  Buddhist Sanskrit  canon (the four AAgamas) that he employed, they  cannot  all be explained  as the standard  six perceptions  based on the six sense organs, but that there   are  various   contexts   of  this  Sanskrit expression   which  justify   it  to  be  understood differently.  

    Now, as Asa^nga continues in his defense of this type of vij~naana, he sets forth three reasons  that surprisingly were not referred to by Schmithausen. I shall  cite  the Tibetan  along  with my translation below   each   passage,  and  then  follow   with  a discussion--insofar as it is possible.

/ ci'i phyir  kun gzhi  rnam par 'ses  pa med na lus kyi tshor ba mi rung zhe na / 'di ltar tshul bzhin nas tshul bzhin ma yin pa sems par byed pa dang / rjes su rtog par byed pa'am  / sems mnyam par bzhag  pa'am  / sems mnyam  par ma bzhag  pa gcig cig lus la tshor  ba rnam pa du ma rnam  pa mang po sna tshogs gang dag 'byung  ba'i rigs na snang  ste / de'i phyir  yang  kun gzhi rnam par 'ses pa yod do /(43)

1.  Why in the absence of aalayavij~naana is the body's  feeling  not  feasible? It is this  way: when positing that the mind attends in the right manner and then imagines in the wrong manner; or that  the  mind  is  equipoised,  then   is  not equipoised, there appear  principles  that bring forth a multitude  of aspects of varied kinds of feelings in a certain body.  Therefore, there is the 'store-consciousness'.

/ ci'i phyir  kun gzhi  rnam par 'ses  pa med na sems med pa'i snyoms par 'jug pa mi srid ce na / 'di  ltar  'du 'ses  med pa la snyoms  par zhugs pa'am/ 'gog pa la snyoms par zhugs pa'i rnam par 'ses pa lus dang bral ba kho nar 'gyur zhing  ma bral  bar mi 'gyur  bas / de'i phyir  'si ba kho nar 'gyur  ba zhig na bcom ldan 'das kyi de skad du / de'i rnam  par 'ses  pa ni lus dang bral ba ma yin no zhes gsungs pa'i phyir ro /(44)

2.  Why in the absence of aalayavij~naana  would there  be no  possibility  of equipoise  without thought  (acittika-samaapatti)? It is this  way: the   vij~naana   that   is  in   non-ideational equipoise   (asa.mj~nika-samaapatti)  or  is  in cessation  equipoise  (nirodha-samaapatti)  only occurs  when  it is absent  from  the  body, and would not occur [that way] when not absent (from the body).  For that reason, it was only for the case of death  that the Bhagavat  declared, "his vij~naana is not absent from the body."

/ ci'i phyir  kun gzhi  rnam par 'ses  pa med na 'chi 'pho mi rung  zhe na / 'di ltar  'pho  ba'i tshe'i  rnam par 'ses  pas lus ro stod  dam / ro smad du drod yal bar byed cing spong  la yid kyi rnam par 'ses pa ni nam yang mi 'byung ba ma yin bas / de'i phyir  lus len par byed pa'i kun gzhi rnam  par 'ses pa kho na dang  bral  bas lus kyi drod yal ba dang / lus la tshor ba med par snang bar zad kyi / yid kyi rnam par 'ses pa dang bral bas ni ma yin te / de'i phyir  yang  mi rung ngo /(45)

3.  Why  in the  absence  of aalayavij~naana  is there  no  feasibility  of transmigration? It is this  way: the vij~naana  at the time  of [dying and] transmigrating  leaves  when the warmth  of the  upper  and lower  parts  of the body  fades away, and the manovij~naana  certainly  does not occur  and  is  not  [at  that  time].  On  that account,   only   in   the   absence    of   the aalayavij~naana  which takes a body does feeling (vedanaa) get lost  in the body, but  this  does not happen through the absence of manovij~naana. So there  is no feasibility  (in the absence  of aalayavij~naana).

    One of the first conclusions  about these  three passages   is  that   Schmithausen   was  wrong   in concluding  that  aalayavij~naana  was necessary  so that  a  meditator   who  is  in  the  trance  state nirodha-samaapatti  would not die there.  Certainly, if Asa^nga  had thought  so, this would be the place for him to have said so. It is a case when vij~naana departs  from the body, but the person  does not die (on  that  account).  But when  a person  does  die, vij~naana  does depart  from the body.  However, the three    passages    certainly    require    further explanations. A certain amount of explication should come through considering certain Schmithausen claims as were alluded to above.

    As to his view that  the aalayavij~naana  is the kind of vij~naana that descends into the male-female element union in the womb, supposedly  bringing life thereto, there is Asa^nga's  own explanation  in the early part of the Yogaacaarabhuumi:

[tatra]   sarvabiijaka.m    vipaakasa.mg.rhiitam aa'srayopaa adaanaad aalayavij~naana.msammuurcchati /(46)

There, the 'store-consciousness'  all-seeded and restrained  by maturation, after taking  a body, faints   (or   falls   unconscious,  or  becomes inactive).


yatra    ca    kalalade'se    tad    vij~naana.m sammuurcchita.m  so 'sya bhavati  tasmin  samaye h.rdayade'sa.h /(47)

    Where  that vij~naana  faints  in a place of the kalala  (initial  form  of the embryo), it [that place] becomes  for it [the embryo] at that time the place of the heart.

    Notice that in this account, the initial form of the embryo  after conception  is already  there when the 'store  consciousness'  enters.  The term kalala  is used in Indian medicine  for the initial embryo.  So it is a case like the Genesis  account  already  mentioned  where  the support world precedes the subjective element.  Thus while  Schmithausen  was  right  about  the role  of aalayavij~naana   to  represent   in  some  way  the vij~naana  that  is the  third  member  of Dependent Origination, and so to fall  into  the womb  (in the human case), it is clear that Asa^nga  does not, and would  not,  ascribe   to  vij~naana   the  role  of conferring  life---as  Schmithausen  claimed.  These remarks  help  to  explain  somewhat  the  third  of Asa^nga's defenses of the aalayavij~naana.

    Then  Schmithausen  claimed,  and  repeated  his claim, that this aalayavij~naana that falls into the womb   is  the   pratisa.mdhi   (rebirth)  type   of vij~naana.  Apparently  because  some  pandits  were espousing  such a theory  at the time of Vasubandhu, he  countered  it  in  no  uncertain  terms  in  his Dependent  Origination  commentary: "it is not right that   the   pratisa.mdhivij~naana   is  by  way  of sa.mskaara   [the   second   member   of   Dependent Origination].  It is true that vij~naana  arises [as the   third    member];    the    Name-and-formation (naama-ruupa) [as the fourth member] arising on that basis  is the  time  of  pratisa.mdhi--this  is  the faultless   position."(48)  Gu.namati   claims  that Vasubandhu's    Abhidharmako'sa    identifies    the pratisa.mdhi  ('linkage'  = reincarnation) with  the skandha  kind of vij~naana.(49) He presumably  means chapter  3, the  introductory  paragraph  to k.  14, where  the first  line in the Sanskrit  text has the expression "five upaadaana-skandha," and in the next line  it says  "The  moment  of pratisa.mdhi  is the birth  in  the  destinies   (gati) "  (upapattibhavo gati.su pratisa.mdhik.sa.na.h).(50)

    Buddhaghosa helps to make sense of the foregoing when, in  his  famous  work  Visuddhimagga, he  sets forth  under  the  topic  of the  fourth  member  of Dependent   Origination    that   the   naaman   (of naama-ruupa), when initially developing in the womb, consists  of three  aggregates.  That is, he defines it, vedanaadayo  tayo khandhaa, "the three  personal aggregates,  feelings, etc.,"(51) thus  leaving  out vi~n~naana  (the  Paali  way of writing  vij~naana), while the standard Abhidharma  listing of the naaman part presents the four members, including vij~naana. This forces the well-known canonical passage holding that naama-ruupa  arises in dependence  on vij~naana and  that   vij~naana   arises   in  dependence   on naama-ruupa  to mean that vij~naana  is added to the naaman to make four.

    In short, when the vij~naana that is number 3 in Dependent  Origination  falls  into  the womb, it is there the 'store  consciousness'  that is a store of seeds.  As to the word 'seed' (biija), Asa^nga gives a set  of words  that  are roughly  definitions, the biija-paryaaya:  realm (dhaatu),  lineage  (gotra) , basic  nature  (prak.rti), basic  cause  (hetu), the real set (satkaaya), elaboration  (prapa~nca), store (aalaya) ,  the   taking   (upaadaana) ,   suffering (du.hkha)  ,   foundation    of    reifying    views (satkaayad.r.s.tyadhi.s.thaana), and  foundation  of 'I  am'  pride  (asmimaanaadhi.s.thaana) --and   any others  belonging  to  the  same  set.(52)  Besides, Asa^nga  gives a list of various  outcomes  of these seeds:  family  (kula) ,  strength  (bala) ,  bodily appearance (ruupa), length of life (aayus), enjoyments (bhoga), and so on;  and of these  effects, principally  good ('subha) and  bad (a'subha) karma  is the cause.(53) Later, Asa^nga  told how this 'store  consciousness' gets its seeds:

evam             avyaak.rtaa             dharmaa ku'salaaku'salaavyaak.rtaan dharmaan aavahanti / tadyathaa      ku'salaaku'salaavyaak.rtabiijakam aalayavij~naanam aavahanti /(54)

    Thus,      the       indeterminate       natures (avyaak.rtadharma)    bring     the    virtuous, unvirtuous,  and   indeterminate   natures,   as follows:  they   bring   (them)  to  the  'store consciousness',  which   is  seeded   with   the virtuous, unvirtuous, and indeterminate.

    Previously  it was mentioned that the Yogaacaara frequently  presents  a list of eight  vij~naana, of which number  7 is the 'defiled  manas' and number 8 is   the    aalayavij~naana.    Now,   in   Buddhist commentarial exegesis of the scriptures, there was a problem   with  the  vij~naana   that  is  third  in Dependent  Origination,  and  was  said  to  have  a 'vision'  of the  birthplace  and so to be attracted thereto.  Now,  even  in  the  Yogaacaara, it  would hardly  be feasible  to identify  this third  member with  the  aalayavij~naana, since  a store  of seeds could  hardly  be called  visionary, except  for the envisioning  of effects, as an acorn  might  be said (poetically  or metaphorically) to foresee  the  oak tree.  But however  we might  credit  the acorn with such an ability, we should  all admit that the acorn cannot imagine  where it will grow.  Vasubandhu  was well   aware   of   the   difficulty,  so   in   his Mahaayaasa.mgraha commentary he said:

    Besides, when the manovij~naana  that is defiled witnesses the birthplace, the intermediate state [between  death  and rebirth]  comes  to an end. That  it "faints"  means  that the manovij~naana comes   together   with   the  male  and  female generative elements, [and] experiences  a single [moment  of] bliss, whereupon  the manovij~naana faints [i.e., becomes unconscious  or inactive], and on the basis  thereof, a different  sort  of manovij~naana enters."(55)

    Since   Asa^nga   had  already   denied   that   the manovij~naana  (i.e., the one based on the manas  as the sixth sense) is operative  at the time of death, Vasubandhu  must mean the seventh vij~naana, what in later  Yogaacaara  was  referred  to as the 'defiled mind' (kli.s.ta-manas).  Later, Vasubandhu comments: "Therefore, the  manovij~naana  that  faints  is not [i.e., is  no  longer]  a  manovij~naana, but  is  a vipaaka-vij~naana  [i.e., a resultative  kind];  and that is 'all-seeded'."(56) He therefore  admits that it was the 'defiled  mind' that falls  into the womb and, once  there, is  called  aalayavij~naana.  This separate  category of a 'defiled mind' seems to have been adopted  for the death  vision, for the visions during  the intermediate  state  (antaraabhava), for the  birth  vision, and perhaps  also  (just  my own speculation)  for   hypnogogic   states   during   a lifetime.

    Now, as this 'store  consciousness'  is credited with  having  a store  of  'all'  dharmas, we should recall that in Buddhist Abhidharma it is the manovij~naana  that has those dharmas supposedly  as object, while it is the sixth sense  manas  that has those dharmas directly  as object.  In the theory of Dependent  Origination   alluded  to  above,  for  a vij~naana    that    arises    in   dependence    on Name-and-Formation,  Gu.namati   explains  that  the manovij~naana is the main one: "Given the set of six vij~naana, only manovij~naana is the fastening (Tib. sbrel ba) of pratisa.mdhi  (the reincarnation)."(57) This means that the fourth member Name-and-Formation is necessary  for  the Abhidharma  manovij~naana  to operate;  so  the  remaining  vij~naanas,  based  on the five  outer-directed  senses, must  require  the fifth member, the Six Sensory Bases (.sa.daayatana), to operate.

    All the foregoing  should clarify that the chief demand  to have the concept  of aalayavij~naana  was for Asa^nga's  third reason--the  theory of rebirth. Schmithausen's  theory that the initial place is the context   of   a  special   yoga   state--that   is, nirodha-samaapatti--is    hardly    tenable.     The discussion  at some length  in the early part of the Yogaacaarabhuumi  shows  that  it was  the  Buddhist arguments  over whether  some persons had or did not have  the  potentiality  of  Nirvaa.na,(58) and  the attempt to justify events of the present dlay as the effect of previous lives, that demanded a carrier of a seed-nature.  This must be why Asa^nga  allows for the operation of aalayavij~naana  when the 'evolving perceptions' are in abeyance.(59)

    But then there are the first and second  reasons that Asa^nga  mentioned.  These  are quite difficult because  yoga  states  are implicated.  When Asa^nga mentioned, as cited  above, that  vij~naana  entered the embryo  at the place where the heart would form, this makes  it clear that when he said in the second reason that  in  the  case  of those  two  kinds  of samaapatti the vij~naana is absent from the body, it means that vij~naana  had left its 'heart' location, and was somewhere  else for the time being (--in the head?). This suggests that the yogin is in a sort of cataleptic  state.  And this seems to be why, in the first  reason,  Asa^nga  had  credited   the  'store consciousness'  with  enabling  the feelings  of the body.  Thus, in certain  trance  states  there  is a local  or more general  loss of feeling, and Asa^nga claims that to understand  what is going on in these specialized   states,  one  must   posit   a  'store consciousness'.  This appears to be enough for these three reasons, as far as this essay is concerned.

    It would also take too much space to go into the matter   of   the   transmutation   of  the   'store consciousness' (aalayavij~naana-pariv.rtti), and the matter  of  which  advanced  persons--a  Buddha,  an arhat,  advanced   bodhisattvas,  and   so  on--have transmuted this 'store consciousness'  and so do not possess  it.(60) But this teaching  shows  that  the aalayavij~naana  theory does not require  it for the yoga experience of ekaagracitta, as it was discussed above, which  implies  a special  condition  of  the evolving perceptions, especially manovij~naana  (the perception  based  on  the  mental  sense  of  mind, manas).

    About   Three  Lak.sa.nas.   There  is  considerable treatment  already in Western  sources  on the three lak.sa.nas of Yogaacaara theory that are also called the three svabhaava.  Nagao  has written  a spirited essay  on the topic, "The  Buddhist  World  View  as Elucidated  in  the  Three-Nature   Theory  and  its Similes."(61) As Nagao describes the three, they are the  imagined  nature  (parikalpita-svabhaava),  the other-dependent  nature  (paratantra-svabhaava), and the  consummated  nature  (parini.spanna-svabhaava). And he explains: "The 'imagined'  nature, therefore, is   characterized   by   'unreality'   and   'total nonexistence'."  "In contrast to this, parini.spanna or 'consummated'  means  perfect, real, and existent and connotes 'reality,''truth,' 'real existence', or 'the absolute'."  "Between them is the third nature, called paratantra, the 'other dependent'. It exists, but only  by depending  on some  other  entity."(62) Nagao   cites   an   important   observation    from Vasubandhu's   Tri.m'sikaa,  k.   21c-d:  "When  the other-dependent  nature  obtains  a state absolutely free  of  the  imagined   nature,  it  is  then  the consummated nature."(63)

    It is the conclusion  of the present writer that this system  of three natures  is very close to what is found in the writings  of the earlier  and famous Naagaarjuna, with the difference that the Yogaacaara thought it was improving in describing what is going on.   I  allude   to  two  verses  in  the  latter's Acintyastava, 44-45:(64)

hetupratyayasambhuutaa       paratantraa      ca sa.mv.rti.h    /   paratantra    iti    prokta.h paramaarthas tv ak.rtrima.h //44
svabhaava.h  prak.rtis  tattva.m  dravya.m vastu sad  ity  api  /  naasti   vai  kalpito   bhaavo paratantras tu vidyate //45

    Convention,   with   dependence    on   other(s) (paratantra),  arises  from  a  cause  and  from conditions. This dependence on other(s) has been announced  (by  Thee) .   The  Absolute  is  not fabricated. (44)

    It  (the  Absolute)  is  termed   self-existence (svabhaava), primary  nature (prak.rti), reality (tattva), substance  (dravya),  abiding  essence (vastu), the really  existent  (sat).  An entity (bhaava)  when  imagined  does  not  exist,  but (exists) when  its  dependence  on  other(s)  is found. (45)

    Notice  the complete  agreement  with the Yogaacaara that  an entity  when imagined  does  not exist, but does exist with its dependence  on another;  and the same word for dependence  on another (paratantra) is used. Naagaarjuna, like the Yogaacaarin espousers of the three svabhaava theory, has an absolute, defined by six terms.  The only seeming  difference  is when Vasubandhu  holds that this absolute  nature  is the other-dependent  nature  when the latter  is free of the imagined nature.  This amounts to accepting  for Dependent  Origination   (pratiityasamutpaada)  that there  is  both  a  conventional   and  an  absolute explanation.  Even if Naagaarjuna  accepts  this, it would  probably  be difficult  to draw  it from  his works.

    This brief account  of the three natures  should suffice.

Clarification of the Position

    Here  I  present  three  clarifications:  (a) in terms  of  subject  and  object,  (b)  in  terms  of Buddhist   logic,  and  (c)  in  terms   of  Western discourse.

    Clarification   in  Terms  of  Subject  and  Object. Previously  I discussed the position in Vasubandhu's treatise  of twenty  verses  and rejected  the claim that he denied external existence. But more needs to be said about this. Vasubandhu in this brief work of his used the term  artha  for the presumed  external object.  Thereby  he could  only implicate  the five outer-directed sense bases that have these arthas as objects.  The word artha in its general Indian usage stands  for property  and goods, and of course these stay behind when a person passes to the other world. This usage of the term seems  to be involved  in its etymology.(65) The sixth  sense, manas, has the  set of dharmas  as object;  and by the indian  theory of transmigration, some of these  may well  be held  to transmigrate.

    Let us now consider  the treatment  in Matilal's book  Perception.  In  an  "Analysis  of  Perceptual Illusion"  he  has  a  subsection  on  two  Buddhist analyses  of  illusion, admitting  that  he  follows Vaacaspati  Mi'sra for these materials;  and this is quite   proper,  because   he  aims   just   not  to misrepresent  the Hindu author.  Matilal  summarizes the  Yogaacaara  position  in seemingly  well-stated sentences,   which   I   shall   number:   (1)  "The object-form  is an integral  part  of the  awareness itself, each awareness being different  from another by virtue  of this unique object-form  which appears in it."  (2) "The  object-form  does  not come  from outside."  (3) "in  fact  when  the  object-form  is projected  outside  or externalized, we are said  to have  an awareness  of the external  object."(66) In all  three  statements, Matilal  attributes  to  the Yogaacaara  that  there  is an 'object-form'  in the mind.  But when we refer to what Vasubandhu said (in his  Vi.m'saatikaa),  we  find  him  explaining  the 'representation-only'  not as an artha, the external object, but as an 'unreal object form' (asadartha)-a poor  copy  of  the  external  object.  Such  a term affirms, rather than denies, what is connoted by the term   artha,  when   it  is  employed   by  itself. Vasubandhu apparently used the term artha instead of the   standard   Buddhist   vi.saya   to  fend   off misattributions of the position he followed.  Still, he was  misunderstood, and  these  misunderstandings were copied over and over.

    Then there is the essay  in Philosophy  East and West by Prasad, who, like  Matilal, is a good writer on these topics.(67) He cites Vasubandhu's  treatise on the three  natures, the  Trisvabhaavanirde'sa, as follows:

    What  is  the  conception   of  that  which   is nonexistent?  [The  answer  is]  'mind'  [mental projection]  / For  by it, the nonexistents  are imagined;  and  inasmuch  as the  mind  imagines objects, they do not exist at all.

    What  is that which  is presented  in cognition? The   nonexistent   which   is   projected   [or imagined].  How is that presented  in cognition? In the  form  of a twofold  appearance  [of  the apprehender and the apprehended] / What is it in cognition that does not exist? That by which the twofold appearance is affected.

    Using  the Sanskrit  for the verses  as is found  in Kochumuttom,(68) I accept Prasad's translation as on the whole correct.  In the case of the second of his cited verses, his rendition may possibly mislead the reader, as suggesting  that  a nonexistent  external has  appeared  in the mind.  I believe  that here we should adhere more literally  to the Sanskrit: tatra ki.m khyaati asatkalpa.h katham khyaati dvayaatmanaa ("What appears there? The imagination  of an unreal. How does it appear? As the subject-object duality"). This subject-object  duality  is found discussed  in Buddhist literature  generally by the terms graahaka (the apprehender) and graahya (the apprehended). The avoidance  of the two is the topic  of the scripture presented  above, the  Kaa.lakaaraama  Sutta.  Thus, when  Vasubandhu  writes  such  verses, he evidently believes that they are consistent  with the Buddha's teachings.

    Clarification    in   Terms   of   Buddhist   Logic. Stcherbatsky  and others  claimed  that  there  is a pronounced  influence  of Yogaacaara  philosophy  on Buddhist   logic  of   the   Dignaaga-Dharmakiirti lineage.(69) If one is to credit the Yogaacaara with such  influence,  one  should  state  the  influence rather  specifically.  I have  previously  published three  essays  on this  matter, "Yogaacaara  and the Buddhist  Logicians, "(70)  "A  Reconsideration   of Dharmakiirti's    'Deviation'   from   Dignaaga   on Pratyak.saabhaasa,"(71) and  "Dharmakiirti  and  the Yogaacaara  Theory  of Biija."(72) In the  first  of these essays I translated Dignaaga's brief treatise, the AAlambanapariik.saa, which deals with the theory of 'atoms', which Vasubandhu  also dealt with in his twenty-verse treatise.  I also cited the commentator Dharmottara's passage explaining the so-called atoms as  constituting  color  (var.na), while  the  shape (sa.msthaana)    was     added,    presumably     in Representation-Only.  The article "A Reconsideration ..." defended Dharmakiirti's position that there are four   kinds   of   falsification    of   perception (pratyak.saabhaasa)   and   that   this   was   also Dignaaga's  position.  The one  on Dharmakiirti  and biija showed that Dharmakiirti  was amenable to this 'seed' way of talking.

    Among the many authors who claim this Yogaacaara influence is C. L. Tripathi, who wrote a book titled The  Problems  of Knowledge  in Yogaacaara  Buddhism that included a treatment  of Buddhist logic.  He is among  the many who think  that Yogaacaara  Buddhism denies  external  existence,  saying: "Vasubandhu... categorically  denies the existence  of the external world."(73) Yet  this  same  author  has  a  chapter "Object of Perception"  presenting  the position  of Buddhist  logic that the object called  svalak.sa.na is the  only  real.(74) He calls  it a 'particular', using  the Western  terminology  of 'universal'  and 'particular'.  This author seems not to realize that if the Yogaacaara does indeed deny external objects, it opposes Buddhist logic--and so why treat Buddhist logic in a book with such a title?

    Now I shall  continue  the discussion  with  the 'falsification    of   perception',   because   this apparently     agrees     with     the    Yogaacaara 'representation-only'.  Vasubandhu's  commentary  on the  Mahaayaasa.mgraha,  its  chapter  2, speaks  of 'representations' (vij~napti) belonging to the body, the body-possessor, and the eater. Here 'body' means the five realms (dhaatu) of (sense organs), eye, and so forth.  'Body-possessor'  is the 'defiled  mind'. The  'eater'  (or  enjoyer) is  the  realm  of  mind (manodhaatu),  that  is,  mind  (manas),  the  sixth sense.(75)   Another   relevant    passage   is   in Vasubandhu's Karmasiddhiprakara.na (I translate from the Tibetan): "There  are  two  kinds  of citta: (1) what collects  its seeds  (=aalayavij~naana);  (2-a) what  has it (i.e., the aalayavij~naana) as a mental support  (aalambana) ,  namely  the  'defiled  mind' (kli.s.tamanas);  (2-b) what has images (aakaara) of it   (i.e.,  the   aalayavij~naana) ,   namely   the manovij~naana;   [and]  (2-c)  what  have  differing distinctions,   namely   the   five   outer-directed perceptions  (vij~naana)."(76) So the 'defiled mind' knows  the  (subconscious)  aalayavij~naana   seeds, while    the   manovij~naana    distinguishes    the (conscious) images  that  the  seeds  have  sprouted into. Then we notice that the traditional set of six vij~naana amounts to 'representations'  because this system uses the convertible terminology cittamaatra, vij~naanamaatra,and vij~naptimaatra. Five of the six are representations of the five sense organs (called the 'body'), while the sixth one is a representation of the sixth sense, manas.

    Now we can compare  with the four kinds of error of  Buddhist  logic.   Dharmottara's  commentary  on Dharmakiirti's Nyaayabindu, following Dharmakiirti's Pramaa.na-vini'scaya, listed  four causes  of error. They are: (1) cause  of error  found  in the object, for example the whirling firebrand taken as a wheel; (2) cause  of error  found  in a place, for  example embarking  in a boat, where  the trees  on the shore are moving;  (3) cause  of error  found  within, for example being troubled  by hatred;  and (4) cause of error  found  in a sense  organ, such as the 'caul', causing  the conch shell to appear yellow.(77) It is reasonable  to compare  with these  four  causes  of error--even  though two are placed externally--since we have shown  above  that Vasubandhu  does not deny externals  as being existent, provided they arise in dependence on another.

    Number  1, cause of error  found  in the object, amounts to representations  based on the sixth sense organ, manas.  Number  2, cause of error  found in a place, also amounts to representations  based on the sixth sense organ, manas. Thus, for numbers 1 and 2, the   representations   are  called   manovij~naana. Skipping  to number  4, cause  of error  found  in a sense  organ,  the  representations   are  the  five outer-directed   perceptions.   Notice   that   this illustration  of a caul on the eyes is precisely the example used by Vasubandhu in the introductory verse to  his  treatise   with   twenty   verses   (above, subsection  "The Theory  that Vasubandhu  Denies the External World").

    Now, going to number 3, the cause of error found within, with the example   of   hatred,  this   clearly   goes   with representations  of the 'defiled  mind'.  About  the 'defiled   mind',   Asa^nga's   Paramaartha-gaathaa, 39-41,  contains  these  points: "The  defiled  mind (kli.s.ta.m   manas)  always   arises    and  ceases together  with  defilements  (kle'sa)";  "On another occasion  it is born  pure";  and  "That  which  was defiled, here  in  the  end  is  purified, with  its intrinsic light (prak.rtibhaasvara)."(78) This shows that the 'defiled mind' requires  defilements, which are dharmas.

    Hence,  the four causes  of error found in those texts of Buddhist logic are reasonably  based on the Yogaacaara theory of 'representation-only', and this is certainly  a better solution  than my old attempt in the Bhandarkar  journal  to associate  these four causes  of error  with  the four  pratyak.sa  of the Buddhist logic system.(79) Accordingly, these causes of error  are  not a theory  that  the  world  is an illusion, since  the causes  of error  can  be 'seen through',  appreciated   for  what   they   are,  in particular.

    Clarification in Terms of Western Discourse.  Modern Western philosophers  have concerned themselves with getting  proper  descriptive   statements  regarding perception  and its associate functions.  Since such topics can generate much writing, shall restrict  my comparisons  to issues raised in an article by Bijoy H.  Boruah,  "Seeing  in  the  Mind's  Eye."(80)  He concerned   himself  with  theories  of  the  author Gilbert  Ryle and others.  He was clearly  impressed with   the   phraseology   by  Elizabeth   Anscombe, 'intentional  seeing'  and  'material  seeing'.  The example was: suppose we look at a painting of Gandhi (the  'material  seeing'), and then  go away and ask ourselves, "What did I see?" Then these authors  are forced  to  use  the  same  expression,  namely  the translation  into  English  of  vij~naptimaatra   as 'representation-only',  but   say  'representational seeing',  which   is  'intentional   seeing',  while Wittgenstein  used words like 'seeing as'.  But then Boruah has to decide that 'seeing in the mind's eye' is not representational  seeing, and this conclusion forces him to reject  various  theories  by Ryle and others. Thus, to see in the mind's eye is to have an image that involves  both "doing and achieving"  and so  is  distinguished   from  "abstract   or  purely conceptual  contemplation."  But  Boruah  recognized (speaking 'metaphorically') that this image "emerges only when the finger  of thought  touches  the right cord of sentience."  He thus admits that a sentience precedes this image.

    Asa^nga--or it might have been the opponent--was cited  above for a consistent  remark, which I would now render: "Besides, there  is no particular  fault in   understanding    that   there    is   a   prior representation."(81)  This  apparently   means,  "At least there is one thing we can agree on--there  was some kind of prior  representation."  Therefore, for the Yogaacaara  theory of the 'store consciousness', the seeds stored here cannot sprout  unless there is a prior 'representation-only'  triggered  by sensory input or by the 'defiled mind'. And the sprouting seeds would provide the images alluded to in Boruah's essay.

    To illustrate the independence of the image from sentience  as well as from  abstract  thought--which Buddhism calls 'discursive thought' (vikalpa, etc.), one  could   take   the  example   of  the  composer Beethoven.  He first  took  classes  in music, heard Bach, and so forth, and this was represented  in his mind, 'heard as'.  Later, he composed great works of music, but this  did not involve  hearing  with  his ear--because he was becoming stone deaf.  Therefore, his auditory imagery of music became independent  of sentience, that  is, in terms  of  hearing  external sounds,  and  was  also  independent  of  discursive thought.  He did have discursive  thought  to change his  score--"I  should  change  it thus"--or to fume against  other  persons,  and  so  forth,  which  is outside his composing music.  Of course, even in his deafness  he still  had visual  input  from  musical scores.

    The example  of Beethoven  also illustrates  the description  of  the  image--here  auditory  imagery (heard  by the  sixth  sense, manas)--as  a sort  of doing and achieving.  The Yogaacaara  issuance  from the 'store consciousness'  that is expressed  in the language  of 'seeds' (biija) amounts to a compatible way of talking  because  the seed  can do something, achieve a result, say, a shoot.  Since this issuance from  the  'store  consciousness'   can  be  of  the indeterminate  as well  as of the  virtuous  and the unvirtuous,  there  are  a  vast  number  of  images possible.  Since  these  images  can also  be called representations, this  shows  the active  nature  of these representations.

    It  is  hoped  that  this  essay, including  the preceding   three   clarifications,  may   help   to elucidate Yogaacaara Buddhism.

Final Declaration

    I hope  that  the  Yogaacaara  system  has  been somewhat clarified  on behalf of anyone who wants it clarified.  The  misrepresentations  of this  system that have appeared  in older  as well as in recently published works are not more correct simply by being copied over and over.  Of course, the Yogaacaara put its trust in the subjective  search for truth by way of a samaadhi.  This rendered the external world not less  real, but less valuable  as the way of finding truth.

    The  tide  of misinformation  on this, or on any other  topic  of Indian  lore  comes  about  because authors  frequently   read  just  a  few  verses  or paragraphs of a text, then go to secondary  sources, or  to treatises  by rivals, and  presume  to  speak authoritatively.  Only after doing genuine  research on  such  a  topic  can  one  begin  to  answer  the question: why  were  those  texts  and  why  do  the moderns write the way they do?

    Decades ago I knew that the Yogaacaara  position was  misrepresented   in  many  works,  ancient  and modern.  Only  recently  was  the  means  to  defend Yogaacaara  Buddhism  put  in my hands, as has  been detailed above.  I do not  care  whether  or not others  are convinced by the arguments presented here.


1 - Cf.  Gregory  J.  Darling, An Evaluation  of the Vedaantic  Critique  of Buddhism (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1987), p.  371, taking notice of an incorrect  portrayal  of Buddhism  in  Vedaantic criticism.
2 - A. Wayman, "The Yogaacaara Idealism," Philosophy East and West 15(1)(1965): 65-73.
3 - T.R.V. Murti, The Central Philosophy of Buddhism (London: George  Allen  and  Unwin  Ltd., 1955), chap.  13, "The Maadhyamika, Vij~naanavaada  and Vedaanta Absolutism," pp. 311-328.
4 - Lambert  Schmithausen,  AAlayavij~naana: On  the Origin  and the Early  Development  of a Central Concept of Yogaacaara  Philosophy, pt.  1, Text; pt.  2, Notes, Bibliography  and Indices (Tokyo: The   International   Institute   for   Buddhist Studies, 1987), here, pt. 1, pp. 13-14.
5 - Alex  Wayman, Analysis  of  the  'Sraavakabhuumi Manuscript, University of California Publications in  Classical  Philology,  vol.   17  (Berkeley, California, 1961).
6 - Alex Wayman, review of Hidenori  S.  Sakuma, Die AA'srayapariv.rttitheorie         in         der Yogaacaarabhuumi..., 2  vols.  (Stuttgart: Franz Steiner   Verlag,  1990) ,  in  Journal  of  the American Oriental Society 113 (1) (1993): 144.
7 - Bhikkhu  ~Naa.nananda, The Magic of the Mind: An Exposition  of the Kaalakaaraama  Sutta  (Kandy, Sri Lanka: Buddhist Publication  Society, 1974), pp. 1-92.
8 - F. L. Woodward, The Book of the Gradual Sayings, vol.  2 (London: Paali  Text Society, 1952), pp. 26-28.
9 - William    G.    Doty,   "Hermes'   Heteronymous Appellations," in James Hillman, ed., Facing the Gods (Dallas, Texas: Spring Publications, 1984), p. 131.
10 - See         Lozang         Jamspal,        ed., Abhidhaanavi'svalocanam    of    'Sriidharasena (Narita: Naritasan  Shinshoji, 1992);  and  see Alex Wayman, trans., Abhidhaanavi'svalocanam of 'Sriidharasena  (Narita:  Naritasan  Shinshoji, 1994).
11 - Alex  Wayman,  "Doctrinal  Affiliation  of  the Buddhist  Master  Asa^nga," in N.  H.  Samtani, ed., Amalaa Praj~naa: Aspect of Buddhistn Studies (Delhi: Sri Satguru Publications, 1989), p.  214 and  n.  74, furnishing  the Tibetan  in transcription for the passage.
12 - See,  e.g.,  Th.   Stcherbatsky,  The   Central Conception  of Buddhism  and the Meaning of the Word "Dharma" (Calcutta: Susil Gupta, 1961), p. 7: "Consciousness, it  is stated, never  arises alone, since it is pure sensation, without  any content."
13 - For this simile, see I. B.  Horner, trans., The Collection   of  the  Middle   Length   Sayings (London:    Luzac,    1967)   ,     vol.     1, Mahaavedalla-sutta, p.  355, where, in the case of  a burning  oil  lamp, "the  light  is  seen because  of the  flame  and the  flame  is seen because of the light."
14 - This  translation   is  in  the  'Sata-Pi.taka series,   Indo-Asian   Literatures,  vol.   74, published  by  the  International   Academy  of Indian  Culture,  New  Delhi,  1968;   and  the passage is at p. 189, where the translator also offers: "What belongs to the triple world, that is (of) mere mind."
15 - Sylvain Levi, Materiaux pour I'Etude du systeme Vij~naaptimaatra   (Paris:  Librairie  Ancienne Honore Champion, 1932), p. 13.
16 - When the Japanese  scholar, Professor  Ryuushin Ohminami, was at Columbia University some years ago studying this scripture with the Vasubandhu commentary  for  a work  in Japanese, he kindly gave me both the Peking Tibetan  Tanjur edition (PTT)  and  the  Derge  Tibetan   edition   for Vasubandhu's   commentary.   I  have  read  the beginning  of the Peking  edition, but  for the present  topic have used just the Derge edition (published   by  Delhi  Karmapae   Chodhey  and printed  at  Mujeeb  Press, 1976), the  part  I discuss at pp. 200 and 202.
17 - As  for the terminological  set of three, as in Vasubandhu's   Abhidharmako'sa,  chap.   2,  k. 34a-b, cf.  Louis de La Vallee Poussin  (Paris, 1923) ,  p.   177,  where   the  autocommentary explains,  "Citta   is  so  named  because   it accumulates  (cinoti);  named manas because  it knows  (manute);  named  vij~naana  because  it distinguishes     its    object    (aalambana.m vijaanaati).
18 - Cf.  the Peking Tibetan  canon (Japanese  photo edition, PTT), vol.  98,  p.  127.5-1,  citing, "khams  gsum  po 'di  ni rnam  par 'ses pa tsam mo"--where    rnam    par    'ses    pa    tsam mo=vij~naanamaatra, and is asserted to be these three worlds.
19 - Wayman,       Abhidhaanavi'svalocanam        of 'Sriidharasena, p.192.
20 - Cf.     Louis    de    La    Vallee    Poussin, L'Abhidharmako'sa   de   Vasubandhu:  Troisieme Chapitre (Paris: Paul Geuthner, 1926).
21 - Cf. T. W. and C.A.F.  Rhys Davids, Dialogues of the  Buddha, pt.  3  (London: Luzac, 1957), pp. 77-94.
22 - For three lexicons which include the definition aalambana,          Anundoram          Borooah, Naanaarthasa.mgraha    (Gauhati:    Publication Board, Assam, 1969), text, p.  3, under "Agra," cites  the  Mediniiko'sa, the  Vi'svaprakaa'sa, and the one by Hemacandra.  For the fourth one, see  Jamspal,  Abhidhaanavi'svalocana, p.  278, no.  1625A.  Besides, aalambana is a definition for agra  in these  two lexicons  of the Deccan College, Poona, series: Naanaarthama~njarii, by Raaghava,  ed.   K.R.V.   Sharma  (1954) ,  and Dhara.niko'sa  by  Dhara.nidaasa,  ed.  E.   D. Kulkarni (1968). The translation by A.  Wayman, Ethics   of  Tibet:  Bodhisattva   section   of Tsong-kha-pa's  Lam rim chen  mo (Albany: State University  of New  York  Press, 1991), adopted the  rendering  'area'  for the  term  agra, as though an area in the mind for meditation.
23 - That  is, while  preparing  my Analysis  of the 'Sraavakabhuumi   Manuscript   (cited   note  5 above).
24 - de   La   Vallee   Poussin,   trans.   of   the Abhidharmako'sa, chap. 1, p. 52.
25 - See  Borooah, Naanaarthasa.mgraha;  definitions from Mediniiko'sa and from Vi'svaprakaa'sa. The same  in  Jamspal,  Abhidhaanavi'svalocana,  p. 297, no. 1742.
26 - Tsewang,  "The   Mentalism   of  Dignaaga   and Dharmakiirti," in Doboom  Tulku, ed., Mind Only School  and  Buddhist  Logic: A  Collection  of Seminar  Papers  (New  Delhi: Tibet  House  and Aditya Prakashan, 1990), p. 15.
27 - See Andre Bareau,  "Abhidharmako'sakaarikaa of Vasubandhu: Index," reprinted  from VAAK(Poona: Deccan College), no. 3:45-83.
28 - Clarence H.  Hamilton, trans., Wei Shih Er Shih Lun, or  The  Treatise  in  Twenty  Stanzas  on Representation-Only    (New   Haven:   American Oriental Society, 1938).
29 - Sarvepalli Radhakrishnan and Charles A.  Moore, A Source Book in Indian Philosophy  (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1957), pp. 328-333.
30 - Sylvain Levi, Vij~naptimaatrataasiddhi  (Paris, 1925; reprint Shanghai, 1940).
31 - Hamilton, Wei Shih Er Shih Lun, p. 61.
32 - Ibid., n. 114.
33 - The  story is cited  in F.  D.  Lessing  and A. Wayman, trans., Introduction  to  the  Buddhist Tantric  Systems  (Delhi: Motilal  Banarsidass, 1978), p. 65.
34 -Thomas  A.  Kochumuttom, A Buddhist Doctrine  of Experience  (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1982), p.  1, contends that the Yogaacaara is really a "realistic  pluralism"  rather  than, as  it is usually described, an "absolute  idealism," and so on.
35 - Stefan   Anacker,  Seven  Works  of  Vasubandhu (Delhi: Motilal  Banarsidass,  1984),  p.  159, rejects the theory--claimed  by some persons to be   the   purport   of   Vasubandhu's   Twenty Verses--that consciousness unilaterally creates all forms in the universe.
36 - T.R.V.   Murti,  The  Central   Philosophy   of Buddhism, p. 319.
37 - Schmithausen, AAlayavij~naana, pt.  1,  pp.  18 ff.
38 - Ibid., p. 31.
39 - Ibid., pp. 36-39.
40 - Ibid., pp. 5 ff.
41 - Asa^nga, in his  Vini'scaya-sa.mgraha.nii, PTT, vol. 110, p. 235.1.
42 - Ibid., p. 235.2.
43 - Ibid., p. 235.4-6.
44 - Ibid., p. 235.4-8.
45 - Ibid., p. 235.5-2.
46 - The Yogaacaarabhuumi  of AAcaarya  Asa^nga, ed. Vidhushekhara      Bhattacharya      (Calcutta: University of Calcutta, 1957), p. 24.4-5.
47 - Ibid., p. 24.18-19.
48 - Vasubandhu, Pratiityasamutpaadaadi-vibha^nganirde'sa, PTT, vol.  104, p.  287.3-3, 4: / de bas na 'du byed kyi rkyen  gyis zhing  mtshams  sbyor ba'i rnam par 'ses  pa yin par rigs  pa ma yin gyi / ... rnam par 'ses pa ni 'du byed kyi rkyen gyis yin no / de'i rkyen  gyis nying  mtshams  sbyor ba'i tshe ming dang gzugs  yin no zhes bya ba de lta bu'i lugs 'di ni skyon med pa yin no /
49 - Gu.namad, Pratiityasamutpaadaadi-vibha^nganirde'sa- tiikaa PTT, vol. 104, p.335-4-2: / chos mngon mdzod las / mtshams sbyor phung po'i rnam par 'ses zhes smras pa.
50.- P.  Pradhan,  ed., Abhidharmako'sabhaa.syam  of Vasubandhu  (Patna:  K.  P.  Jayaswal  Research Institute, 1975), p. 124.
51 - Visuddhimagga of Buddhaghosaacariya, ed.  Henry Clarke Warren, revised  by Dharmananda  Kosambi (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1950), p. 477,  par.   187.
52 - Bhattacharya, The Yogaacaarabhuumi  of AAcaarya Asa^nga, p.26. 18-19.
53 - Ibid., p. 25.13-14.
54 - Ibid., p. 109.13-15.
55 - Vasubandhu, in Derge edition of Tibetan Tanjur, Sems  tsam, vol.  Ri, f.  135a-5, 6: / de  yang nyon mongs  pa can gyi yid kyi rnam par 'ses pa skye ba'i srid pa la dmigs nas bar ma do'i srid pa 'gag par 'gyur ro / brgyal ba de la zhes bya ba ni yid  kyi rnam  par  'ses  pa khu  ba dang khrag  dang lhan cig grub pa dang / bde ba gcig par 'gyur ba ste / yid kyi rnam par 'ses brgyal par gyur  pa de la brten  nas yid kyi rnam  par 'ses pa gzhan nyid 'jug par 'gyur ro /
56 - Vasubandhu, Derge, Sems tsam, Ri, f. 69a-5,6: / de'i phyir rnam par 'ses brgyal  ba gang yin pa de ni yid kyi rnam par 'ses  pa ma yin gyi / de ni rnam par smin  pa'i rnam  par 'ses pa ste de sa bon thams cad pa'o /
57 - Gu.namati, Pratiityasamutpaadaadi-vibha^nganirde'sa- .tiikaa PTT, vol.104, p.337.3-3:/ rnam par 'ses pa'i tshogs drug go zhes gsungs  kyang yid kyi rnam par 'ses pa kho nas nying mtshams sbrel ba yin pa.
58 - Asa^nga alludes to this in the Yogaacaarabhuumi early    section,    in    Bhattacharya,    The Yogaacaarabhuumi   of   AAcaarya   Asa^nga,  p. 25.1-2.
59 - Buddhist  Insight: Essays  by Alex  Wayman, ed. George  R.  Elder (Delhi: Motilal  Banarsidass, 1984), p. 330.
60 - Ibid., p. 330.
61 - Gadjin  M.  Nagao, Maadhyamika  and Yogaacaara, trans.   Leslie  S.   Kawamura  (Albany:  State University  of New York Press, 1991), chap.  6, pp. 61-74.
62 - Ibid., p. 62.
63 - Ibid., p. 70.
64 - Among  the  editions,  there  is  one  in  Chr. Lindtner,    Nagarjuniana    (Delhi:    Motilal Banarsidass,  1987), and  another  in  Fernanda Tola  and  Carmen   Dragonetti,  "Naagaarjuna's Catustava," Journal  of  Indian  Philosophy  13 (1985).
65 - See the essay by M. A. Mehendale, "Etymology of the Word Artha-," in his Nirukta  Notes, series 1 (Poona: Deccan College, 1965), pp. 42-46.
66 - Bimal  Krishna  Matilal,  Perception   (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986), p. 189.
67 - Chakravarthi  Ram Prasad, "Dreams  and Reality: The 'Sa^nkarite  Critique  of Vij~naana-vaada," Philosophy  East and West  43 (3) (July  1993): 405-455.
68 - Kochumuttom, A Buddhist Doctrine of Experience, p. 93.
69 - Cf.   F.   Th.   Stcherbatsky,  Buddhist  Logic (reprint, New York: Dover Publications), 1:29.
70 - Alex  Wayman, in Journal  of the  International Association  of Buddhist  studies 2 (1) (1979): 65-78.
71 - Alex  Wayman,  in  Annals, Bhandarkar  Oriental Research  Institute  (Diamond  Jubilee Volume), 1977-1978, pp.  387-396.
72 - Alex Wayman, in Ernst Steinkellner, ed., Studies in  the  Buddhist  Epistemological   Tradition: Proceedings   of   the   Second   International Dharmakiirti  Conference,  Vienna, June  11-16, 1989   (Wien:   Verlag   der   Osterreichischen Akademie   der   Wissenschaften,   1991) ,  pp. 419-430.
73 - Tripathi,   The   Problem    of   Knowledge.... (Varanasi: Bharat-Bharati, 1972), p. 333.
74 - Ibid., pp. 150-151.
75 - Vasubandhu,  Derge,  Sems  tsam,  vol.  Ri,  f. 143b-4: / lus dang/ lus can  dang  / za ba po'i rnam  par rig pa zhes bya ba de la / lus ni mig la sogs  pa'i  khams  lnga'o  / lus can ni nyon mong  pa can gyi yid  do/  za ba po ni yid  kyi khams so /
76 - Ibid., vol.  'Si, f.  141b-3: / sems ni rnam pa gnyis te / de la gcig ni de'i sa bon rnams bsag pa yin no / gnyis  pa ni de'i  dmigs  pa dang / rnampa  dang  / bye brag tha dad pa dag gis sna tshogs pa yin no /
77 - Wayman, in Annals, Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute, pp. 393-394.
78 - Alex  Wayman, Analysis  of the  'Sraavakabhuumi Manuscript,  p.   173;   reprinted   in  Elder, Buddhist Insight, p. 340.
79 - Wayman,  Annals, Bhandarkar  Oriental  Research Institute.
80 - Boruah's  essay appeared  in Journal  of Indian Council   of  Philosophical   Research   6  (3) (May-August 1989): 119-130.
81 - Since  this remark  is important, I should cite the Tibetan  (alluded  to in note  11 above): / rnam  par rig pa sngon  'gro  ba nyid  du rtogs pa'ang  de lta na nyes pa khyad  par med pa kho nar 'gyur ro /

Printed by Mei-yu Chan Proofread by Wen-ying Lai